This paper proposes a new approach to computing the reliability of a system. Worst pattern analysis fmds the component misbehavior pattern that produces the greatest system unreliability. The motivation is that it is difficult and expensive to obtain information about the behavior of faulty components. It is also difficult and expensive to obtain information about a system's response to faulty components. For these reasons, this approach is based on minimum information about faulty components, and minimum requirements for system response. There are two minimum requirements. First, quantitative reliability requires that the failure rate of the components be known. Second, long term reliability requires that the system recognize when a redundant unit is misbehaving. In the worst pattern approach all other information is replaced by a computational effort. The procedure is illustrated by an example.
Introduction
We propose a new method of establishing the reliability of redundantheconfigurable systems. This approach is based on using a minimum of data about device failures and system response to faulty components. This section discusses the basis of this approach, the approach itself, the relation of this approach to future systems, and a survey of the literature that places this approach in context.
Basis of Approach
redundant and reconfigurable digital systems. Such systems have a number of major components whose faulty behavior can be observed (by comparison since it's a redundant system). Components known to be faulty can be replaced during maintenance. These components are built of devices whose failure rate is known. (If their failure rate is not known, there cannot be a quantitative reliability assessment.) Their behavior when faulty, however, This approach is based on the architecture of may not be known. In addition, since these devices are embedded in the system's major components, the manifestation of faults can be a complicated process. This is displayed in figure 1. If an embedded device becomes faulty, the best behavior is that no incorrect result ever appears on the major component's output registers (or output pins). The next best behavior is that incorrect results immediately and constantly appear on the component's output registers. In the latter case the component can be replaced at maintenance before other components become faulty.
The worst pattern is that misbehavior occurs infiequently enough that the fault is classified as transient and faulty components accumulate in the system, but frequently enough that there is a good probability of multiple component misbehavior once a number of faulty components have accumulated.
In this scenario, faults are benign when they first occur because their effects must propagate to the output registers. Let J3 be the benign to active rate. Figure 2 shows the probability of failure plotted against J3. 
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Worst Pattern Analysis
Straightforward worst pattern analysis has three requirements-a field data requirement, a design requirement, and a modeling requirement. The field requirement is that the failure rate of the components is known. This is essential for any quantitative assessment of reliability. The design requirement is that the system recognizes when a major component is misbehaving. This can be established by a combination of testing and arguments from design. This is a stringent requirement, but not as difficult as providing diagnostics for embedded devices. The modeling requirement is a description (model) for the system's detection and handling of component misbehavior. This description includes a model of the algorithms for deciding whether a component has a permanent or transient fault.
It looks possible, although it has not yet been done, to combine worst pattern analysis with other approaches to reliability assessment. We'll consider two possibilities. First, the design requirement that the system recognize component misbehavior may be only partially established. In this case we can adopt methods used for imperfect diagnostics (or lack of coverage) where some fraction of the misbehavior that occurs is not recognized or not handled correctly. Relevant papers on determining and modeling a lack of coverage are listed in the literature survey. Second, it's possible that a significant fractiQn of device misbehavior and error propagation is understood and can be modeled. There are a large number of papers on fault injection (see the literature survey). In this case, a less conservative reliability estimate can be obtained by performing fault injections
Future Systems
devices and the integration of more functions on a chip. Worst pattern analysis goes well with both these predictions. If there are a large number of devices, it becomes difficult to determine the faulty behavior of all (or a significant fraction) of them. More complicated devices will have more complicated faulty behavior. For both cases, a method that requires a minimum of information is appealing.
In addition, for the future, we expect an increase in computational capacity. This favors a method that depends on computational effort instead of experimental effort.
For the future we expect a proliferation of Literature Survey a fruiffil area for probability modeling and new computational approaches [ 11. For the reliability analysis of reconfigurable systems, there appears to be two major strands. One strand assumes that faults manifest themselves quickly, and the characteristics of fault propagation and manifestations are included in a reliability model. The resulting class of reliability models generates several computational problems. One is numerical stiffness, the combination of slow fault arrival with fast and complicated fault recovery. The stiffness problem is usually handled by model approximation [2, 3] . Another computational problem is the generation and analysis of the extremely large models for redundantheconfigurable systems. This has prompted advances in computational methods [4] . This last paper is encouraging for the computational burden encountered when doing worst pattern analysis because computational problems become research topics for numerical analysts and computer scientists. As part of this approach where faults manifest themselves quickly, there are efforts to model fault propagation and effect [5,6, 7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, The other major strand is coverage. Coverage can be defined as the probability of a good outcome given a fault occurrence. The meaning of "good outcome" depends on the circumstances, but there are two common interpretations. One is the diagnostic problem-some faults when injected remain undetected (at least for the duration of the experiment). Another (more comprehensive) interpretation is the correct handling of a faulty component-its detection, identification, and Worst pattern analysis changes the nature of fault injection. It is no longer necessary to study the propagation of errors from a faulty embedded device to the interfaces of a major component where they can be observed by the system. It is only necessary to establish that the system recognizes errors at the interfaces of its major components.
Description of Example
The sections below describe the system architecture, the fault handling strategy, the Markov model for the system and faults, and the system parameters. Finally, the numerical range for the misbehavior model is derived fiom the system parameters and the operating time.
Architecture
cold spare. When an original member of the threeplex is declared (permanently) faulty, it is replaced by the spare. When another component is declared faulty, the system becomes a duplex.
The system is a reconfigurable threeplex plus a There is system failure whenever half (or more) of the working components are actively faulty.
Fault Behavior and Handling Models
The single fault model is in figure 3. The mnemonics are g for a good component, b for a faulty but benign component, and a for an actively faulty component. In state bggl, the fault has arrived. The benign to active rate is p, and the active to benign rate is a. When the fault is in the active mode, the system decides it is permanent and removes it at rate E. The fault can become benign before the system removes it in which case the system decides it is a transient at rate 8. If it becomes active again before the system decides it is a transient, the system removes it.
The double fault model is in figure 4 with the same mnemonics and rates. State F is the failure state. 
12.D.4-3
In state bbgl, both faults have just arrived or have been quiescent for a sufficient period to have been declared transients. In state abg, one of them has become active. If the other fault becomes active there is system failure. The active fault is removed at rate E. In bbg2 the first faulthas become benign. If it becomes active before being declared transient, it is removed. In bbg2 the other fault (in a different component) can become active, causing a transition to state bag. In state bag, the system is still tracking the first fault (now benign), and if it remains quiescent the system declares it a transient and the system goes to state abg. From state bag the system can fail or remove the active fault (at the indicated rates). If the second fault becoming benign is the first event that occurs, then the system goes to state bbg3 where the system is still tracking both faults (since both faults were recently active). If either fault becomes active in state bbg3, it is removed. The faults in state bbg3 are declared transient (one at a time) if they remain quiescent for a sufficient period. 
Markov Model
The Markov model uses the three requirements for doing worst pattern analysis. First, the failure rate for all the devices is known. Each major component (a module of the threeplex) has a total failure rate of A. Second, the model includes the feature that the system recognizes when a major component is misbehaving. The inclusion of this element in the model is subtle. Essentially, the transition represented by the rate E is a complete density function-if a component misbehaves long enough, it will be removed. Third, there is a description (model) for the system's detection and handling of component misbehavior. That is, we have the transitions represented by the rates E and 8, and numerical values for these rates.
The model is presented in five panels (see Figures 5-9) . The failure state F is state number 36. 
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System Parameters
The system parameters are:
failure rate = h = le4/hour fault removal rate = E = le+3/hour quiescent rate = 8 = 5e+2/hour
The operating time is T = 2 hours. The control cycle is 50 milliseconds (20hecond).
Fault Behavior Parameters
for faults is based on the operating time, the control cycle time, and the results of preliminary numerical studies.
Since the control program operates at twenty cycles per second, the smallest average time for p (the benign to active rate) is 1/40 seconds which is equivalent to a rate of 144,000 per hour. Rounding up gives a maximum value of le+6/hour. Since the operating time is two hours, it appears reasonable to The range of values for the on-and-off cycle
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choose 100 hours as the largest average time for p.
This gives a rate of le-2hour.
Because an incorrect result remains at the output registers for at least one control cycle, the smallest average time for a (the active to benign rate) is 1/20 seconds which is equivalent to a rate of 72,000 per hour. Rounding up gives a value of 1 e+5/hour. Based on preliminary numerical results, a maximum rate of 1 e+6/hour was chosen. Since the operating time is two hours, it appears reasonable to choose 100 hours as the largest average time for a. This gives a rate of 1 e-2hour.
from 1 e-1 per hour to 1 e+6 per hour.
Hence, for this system, both a and p range
Single Operating Period Results
This section finds the worst fault behavior pattern for the system during a single operating period of two hours. It has been located by two different methods. 
System Lifetime Results
period of time and they are undetectable when benign, there is a possibility of imperfect diagnostics for the maintenance checks between operating periods. The previous section, with its analysis of a single operating period, assumed that maintenance (between operating periods) detects all faults, even if they were benign during the operating period. This section assumes the opposite--faults are only detected during the operating period. Between operating periods, all the components detected as faulty are replaced with Since faults can stay benign for a considerable
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good components. Let sf@) be the probability of being in state k after an operating period, and let si(k) be the initial value for the next operating period. The assignment statements that give the replacement of components declared faulty are: si( 1 )=sf( l)+sf(5)+sf(9); si(2)=sf(2)+sf(6)+sf( 10); si(3)=sq3)+sf(7); si(4)=sf(4)+sf( 8); si(5)=si(6)=.. .=si(23)=0; si (24)=sf (24)+sf( 1 2); si (25) =sf (25) +sf( 1 3) ; si(26)=@26)+sf( 14); si (27) =sf (27)+sf( 1 5); si (28)=sf (28) The computations assume the system has a lifetime of 20,000 two-hour operating periods. This is about six operations per day for ten years. The results are in figure 1 1. The max value is P(F} = 4.338 e-4 for a = 1 e+6 and p= 1 e-1. 
Summary
This paper considers one of the outstanding problems in establishing the fault tolerance of a redundant and reconfigurable system-the lack of information about the behavior of faulty devices and the manifestation of faulty behavior in a complex system. The solution offered is to find the misbehavior pattern that produces the largest probability of system failure. The largest probability appears when misbehavior occurs infrequently enough that the fault is classified as transient and faulty components accumulate in the system, but frequently enough that there is a good probability of multiple component misbehavior once a number of faulty components have accumulated. Since any other misbehavior pattern (including the actual misbehavior pattern) produces a smaller probability of failure, this maximum value can be used as metric for system reliability. This approach has three requirements. The field data requirement is that the failure rate of the components is known. The design requirement is that the system recognizes when a major component is misbehaving.. The modeling requirement is a description (model) for the system's detection and handling of component misbehavior.
The technique is applied to an example to get both single operating period and lifetime results.
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